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ABSTRACT: Ukraine is the largest country that is included in European Neighbor-
hood Policy. That is why the European Union should spotlight relations with this 
eastern partner, especially by foreign policy instruments like association agree-
ment. The focus here is on the EU’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis in period 
from Maidan revolution at the end of 2013, which was occasioned by the rejection 
of the association agreement with the EU by President Viktor Yanukovych, and 
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to stabilize the political environment in the nearby neighborhood and eliminate 
threats, which are the results of war between Ukraine and Russia.
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The European Union, as an autonomous participant of inter-
national relations, tries to play a role of a continental stabilizer, or 
a stabilizer of the world security system, which results both from 
the necessity of securing the interests of the whole organization, 
and also its individual states, in addition to protecting the organi-
zation’s character itself. The position and attractiveness of Europe, 
which can be utilized in order to perform the abovementioned role, 
and also to express its position in the international system, was 
built on making the idea of creating a peace and prosperity zone 
come true and on refraining from enfeebling conflicts (Nye, 2007: 
111). The question remains if in today’s international relations the 
idea of such behavior has not altered into political anemia and lack 
of readiness to undertake any serious steps by the European Union.
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These considerations on the Union’s participation in the various 
individual dimensions of the international system are crucial for an 
appropriate analysis and an attempt to comprehend the present 
activities or stances of the EU concerning the dramatic events in 
Ukraine, which is not only the united Europe’s neighbour, but also 
the country whose pro-European aspirations have literally been bro-
ken. Assessing the dramatic news on the situation in this country, 
one can attribute this term not only to the direction of its foreign 
policy, but also to the manner in which its statehood functions. The 
question remains if the position and actions undertaken by the EU 
can contribute to resolving a political stalemate and finding effective 
solutions for fulfilling the pro-European aspirations of Ukraine.
Speaking generally about the determinants shaping the re-
lations between the EU side and the Ukrainian one (Rydlewska, 
2005), one should emphasize their complexity and the extent of 
their complicated nature.1 The second decade of the twenty-first 
century, demonstrated that the real possibility of a comprehensive 
unification of the Ukrainian market with the European Economic 
Area, and of consolidating Kiev’s political aspirations concerning its 
integration with the EU, still exists. It refers to the negotiations and 
signing the Association Agreement between the interested parties, 
which would be connected with the establishment of a deep and 
comprehensive free trade zone. However, on 21st November 2013, 
Kiev’s government took a crucial decision about suspending the 
decision about signing the Association Agreement at the Eastern 
Partnership summit during the Lithuanian presidency (Fact Sheet 
EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 2). The Ukrainian public opin-
ion hoped that President Viktor Yanukovych would ratify it during 
the Vilnius meeting on 28th November, but it also did not happen. 
The participants in the talks expressed their optimism that even-
tually the Agreement would be signed and its conditions would be 
implemented.2
1 The comparison that Ukraine is for the Western Europe countries like a suit-
case without a handle, because it is hard to carry, but one does not want to get 
rid of it, is widely repeated. Such sayings perfectly reflected these relations on the 
turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
2 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29 Novem-
ber 2013, Web: 11 April 2014 <http://static.eu2013.lt/uploads/documents/Pro-
gramos_12/131129%20Vilnius%20Summit%20Declaration.pdf>, p.1;4 The stance 
of the EU structures to a large extent is based on the statement of the Council of 
the European Union from 10th December 2012, in which it expressed its willing-
ness to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, when Ukraine would 
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At the same time, Kiev’s streets witnessed a popular movement 
called later the Euromaidan, which turned from mass demonstra-
tions into an organized political power, which logistically occupied 
a significant area of the capital and became a factor stimulating 
the changes in the national authorities. It is worth stressing that 
the main motivation of the average Ukrainians participating in this 
event, no matter what their political sympathies and affiliations 
were, was opposing the establishment and hostile regime, rid-
dled with corruption, taking care of their own interests and acting 
against the citizens themselves. Additionally, the strong element 
of stopping the integration with the EU, identified with the mythi-
cal Westernization of state structures and high standards of liv-
ing, or with stimulating the process of multifaceted modernization, 
emerged. What is significant, in the EU’s opinion, was the peace-
ful nature of the Maidan protest, (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations 
Brussels, 2014: 1–2) which is very important when taking into ac-
count the various interpretations and media coverage concerning 
the events in the centre of Kiev, including using violence by the 
militiamen and the protesters.3
Speaking about the entire EU Eastern policy, it is worth high-
lighting that underestimating the Kremlin’s behaviour and its at-
tempt to influence Eastern Europe’s fate after the collapse of the 
bilateral system was a mistake. Before the conflict in Georgia, Kevin 
Ryan, an American journalist, portrayed Moscow’s policy as “much 
barking, little biting.”4 The Russian President preferred a game 
of provocation, whose final result was to be a confrontation. The 
be able to carry out the terms of this document, see: Council of European Union, 
Council conclusions on Ukraine, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 
10 December 2012,Web 4 June 2014 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf>
3 According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs 16 policemen were 
killed, see: http://mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/ru/publish/article/989615, 
30.05.2014. The victims on the protesting side equalled approximately 104 people; 
it is hard to establish, because there exist various sources, reports on abductions, 
individual killings, Cabinet to pay families of Maidan victims 100 living wages each, 
Web: 30 may 2014 <http://24tv.ua/home/showSingleNews.do?cabinet_to_pay_
families_of_maidan_victims_100_living_wages_each&objectId=426530&lang=en>
4 See: Ryan K. “Lots of Bark but Little Bite,” Moscow Times (Jun. 16 2008 
00:00), Web 4 June 2014 <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/lots-
of-bark-but-little-bite/368284.html>
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clear example of such behaviour was influencing Armenia in order 
to block its signing the Association Agreement with the EU.5
The intervention in Crimea and holding the referendum on the 
status of this area on 16th March 2014 constitutes a quintessence 
of such a policy. It is worth remembering that the majority of the 
Tatars supported the integrity of the Ukrainian state, which mani-
fested in boycotting this event by this ethnic group. It is very im-
portant for the perception of the falsified results of this pseudo-
democratic enterprise, since the Tartar minority made up 12% of 
the community living on the peninsula (Amnesty International Pub-
lic Statement, 2014: 1). On 3rd March 2014, during its emergency 
meeting, the Council of the European Union criticized the attack 
of the Russian military forces, which undermined the sovereignty 
and integrity of the Ukrainian state. Moreover, the European Coun-
cil expressed the similar opinion in its statement of 6 March 2014 
(European Council, Statement of the Heads of State or Government 
on Ukraine, 2014: 1). It was connected with the clear disapproval of 
the Russian Duma authorizing the utilization of its military forces 
on the terrain of Ukraine issues on 1March. What is more, the EU 
side in its talks with the Russian Federation was supposed to aim 
at forcing it to respect the agreement concerning stationing the 
Black Sea Fleet from 1997 (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations Brus-
sels, 2014: 3). Of course, there is no denying the rationality of such 
an approach and such an assessment of the existing conflict by 
Brussels, but the question remains whether such a negative stance 
was at all taken into account by the Kremlin in the further planning 
of its activities. In the author’s opinion the style of conducting poli-
tics by the Russian policy makers indicates that in their activities 
they focus on Kiev’s steps and the steps of the individual European 
governments, and not on the general documents, conclusions, etc. 
crystallized with the delay of the EU forum.
With the initial lack of will to carry out these basic political 
steps, it was known that the Russian Federation will meticulously 
aim at fulfilling its own strategic goals with scant regard for the re-
action of the international surroundings, i.e. also European struc-
tures. That is why the European Union did not recognize the va-
lidity of the whole referendum process in Crimea and its results. 
5 The negotiations concerning this document were already finalized in July 
2013; however, Yerevan decided to start closer cooperation with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan in August 2013, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_
en.htm, 01.06.2014
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The basis for such an assessment was clear breaching of the 
Ukrainian Constitution and the determined efforts to further an-
tagonize the situation inside the EU Eastern neighbour (Fact Sheet 
EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 3). The actual annexation of 
Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia was criticized by the European 
Council on 20th March 2014, which indicates the unambiguous 
interpretation of the drastic events in the south of Ukraine by the 
governments of the EU member states. Additionally, the European 
Commission was to examine the legal implications of such actions 
by the Russian Federation and prepare immediate economic steps 
aimed at the annexed peninsula.
In their declarations, the European leaders took into consid-
eration undertaking further negative economic actions directed at 
the Russian market and entities; of course, if the Kremlin would 
not stop further destabilization of Ukraine. It is very difficult to de-
termine how severe these actions can be and on what scale, what 
their real consequences can be and how strong the solidarity of the 
member in their implementation states will be. What is interesting, 
in the European Council’s opinion, Russia’s aggressive activities 
will result in worsening its multifaceted relations both with the EU 
and its individual member states (European Council, Statement of 
the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, 2014: 2). Despite the 
fact that such an assumption is created by a body consisting of the 
heads of governments and Heads of State of the EU countries, the 
political practice showed something completely different, casting 
doubt on the significance of such statements and the essence of 
shaping EU foreign policy by its members.6
Nevertheless, the aspect of the dialogue between Brussels and 
Kiev, which in fact is responsible for the internal situation and 
selecting the direction of the Foreign policy, is very important. Ar-
senij Jaceniuk, the Ukrainian Prime Minister, who after dismiss-
ing Yanukovych from his position on 23 February 2014 held the 
most important office in the country, was a person accepted by 
the EU bodies (European Council, Statement of the Heads of State 
or Government on Ukraine, 2014: 1), which was very important in 
6 In this aspect, it is important to analyze the relations between the Russian 
Federation and Germany, which currently are the main driving force of both the 
Euro zone and of the general European integration. The German Federal Republic 
is the main trade partner of the Russian side, which apart from the German invest-
ments endeavors to absorb the German model of organization and management, 
which is important for the revival after the collapse of the USSR.
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the sphere of the diplomatic relations with this country and for the 
debate undertaken by Brussels concerning the development of the 
situation in its Eastern neighbour. Looking further, the EU bodies 
tried to observe functioning of the Ukrainian institutions such as 
the Supreme Council of Ukraine. The goal was to determine the 
political tendencies among the policy makers and to assess how 
the crisis affects the functioning of the political regime. Moreover, 
Catherine Ashton’s meetings with the representatives of the main 
political powers on the Ukrainian political scene, such as the lead-
ers of the Party of Regions and the former Prime Minister, Yulia 
Tymoshenko (Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
at the End of her Visit to Ukraine, 2014: 1), may prove that the Eu-
ropean Union endeavoured to play the role of an actual mediator or 
to formulate a balanced opinion on the existing internal situation 
of the Eastern neighbour. Nevertheless, it should be remembered 
that these were classical diplomatic contacts at the highest level, 
and not probing the situation in the conflict areas.
It was also an attempt to influence the actions of Kiev’s govern-
ment, also in the aspect of the internal affairs. In the EU’s opin-
ion, all the activities of the Ukrainian policy makers should serve 
to enact laws and to strengthen internal structures reinforce the 
authority of the state. Additionally, it is worth stressing that all 
the Russian actions are planned so as to destabilize the Western 
neighbour (Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on the Situation in Eastern Ukraine, 2014: 1). The Ukrainian Min-
istry of Internal Affairs maintained contact with the EU structures 
in order to communicate the emerging problems and suggesting 
the potential spheres in which the external technical assistance is 
expected. The subjects of the talks obviously concerned the security 
dimension and the activities of the Ukrainian security and policing 
services, i.e. the matters determining the protection of Ukrainian 
citizens (Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at 
the End of Her Visit to Ukraine , 2014: 2).
The EU bodies were aware that the assistance in building stable 
and lasting social and economic institutions in the Ukrainian state 
requires multidimensional involvement by experts in the individual 
areas of this country’s political and economic system (European 
Commission’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 7). That is why, on 9th April 
2014, on the initiative of the European Commission, the support 
group for the Ukrainian government was established, whose main 
goal is to assist in all the reforms and decisions required for achiev-
ing the stabilization of the whole country (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Re-
lations Brussels, 2014: 5). Looking very critically at the functioning 
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of such an expert body appointed by the European Union, one can 
state that in the present situation Ukraine needs military peace 
forces or allied forces and not EU clerks.
The signing of only the political part of the Association Agree-
ment on 21st March 2014 constituted a significant political fact in 
the bilateral relations between Brussels and Kiev. Obviously, ac-
cepting further terms of the agreement and putting the conditions 
of the entire Agreement into practice when the sovereign Ukraine 
will be ready is supposed to be the next step. The intention of car-
rying out such steps was included in the statement of the Euro-
pean Council of 6th March 2014 (European Council: Statement of 
the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, 2014: 3), so it gained 
the support of all the heads of governments of the member states, 
who in reality should aim at creating the political climate conducive 
to putting such a document into practice. The plan of implementing 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement was updated during 
the meeting of the Cooperation Council for the UE and Ukraine 
on 24th June 2013 (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 
2).This indicates how big a shift took place in fulfilling pro-Euro-
pean ambitions of the Eastern neighbour, which had already had 
a set agenda concerning of implementing the final resolutions of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, and then had to defend its 
statehood and its basic functions in order to still function as an in-
dependent international entity. What is more, in Herman von Rom-
puy’s – the President of the European Council – opinion, the signing 
of the political terms of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
should be treated as supporting the Ukrainian geopolitical ambi-
tions (European Council The President 1). It was an important act of 
lending a hand to Kiev’s government, giving it international the le-
gitimization in the international arena and showing the significance 
of the progress of talks concerning the abovementioned agreement. 
On the other hand, looking at the manner in which Ukraine had 
to await the possibility of conducting the talks on the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement granted by Brussels and of the defec-
tiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in terms of 
stabilizing the existing crisis, the fact of signing the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement in the limited version may not bear any 
real consequences.7
7 The terms of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1994 or the 
Action Plan from 2005 in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy can-
not constitute the adequate directions for the current relations between Brussels 
and Kiev, and outline the necessary frameworks of the reforms.
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When assessing the whole Ukrainian political scene, we can 
observe that the tragedy of the situation mainly results from the 
lack of possibility to stop shedding the citizens’ blood – also of those 
average citizens who just happen to live in the area of this acute 
conflict (Emerson, 2014: 1) – by the political leaders. So who and in 
what manner could cause the wave of violence to cease? Due to the 
nature of its decision-making process and its characteristic as an 
international entity, the EU decided to introduce sanctions. The 
first sign of such actions was the implementation of the personal 
restrictions on 3rd March 2014, introduced by the Council of the 
European Union. These restrictions concerned 18 people and were 
imposed for 12 months on the people who misappropriated the EU 
assistance funds, which had to be frozen (EU Freezes Misappropri-
ated Ukrainian State Funds, 1). It is worth emphasizing that the 
process of expanding the list of the people affected by EU sanctions 
is constantly updated and supplemented. In turn, on 17th March 
2014, the sanctions banning travel and freezing assets in the ter-
ritory of the European Union were aimed at 21 people responsible 
for implementing the aggressive Russian policy against Ukraine. 
These punishments were then extended and included 12 other pol-
icy makers (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 3–4). 
And then, this list was expanded to 48 people on the basis of the 
decision of the Foreign Affairs Council of 14 April 2014 (Council of 
the European Union, EU Strengthens Sanctions against Actions Un-
dermining Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity 1).
During the Ukrainian crisis, the debate on the sensibility of 
utilizing the 2nd or 3rd level of sanctions and on the effectiveness 
closing itself to the Russian Federation, its citizens, its economic 
entities, etc. is being held. Commentaries appeared that argued 
if the EU wanted to be perceived as a real geopolitical player, it 
should rather concentrate on the real actions in the key political ar-
eas and on responding to the current events (Blockmans and Gros, 
2014: 1). The US government behaved in a similar manner, and 
while it had earlier introduced the so called “reset” with relations 
with Russia, but the new existing situation required the reorienta-
tion of the current policy on its part.8 In practice, it concerned the 
8 Additionally, the issue of the potential membership of Ukraine to the NATO 
structures is discussed, see: Goldgeier, J. “The ‘Russia Reset’ Was Already Dead; 
Now It’s Time for Isolation”: Web: 30 May 2014 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/02/the-russia-reset-was-already-dead-now- 
its-time-for-isolation/>
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ban on issuing visas, freezing financial assets, and also introduc-
ing trade restrictions. In turn, looking at the personal details of the 
people and entities affected by the sanctions, the CEO of Rosnieft, 
Igor Siechin, or the financial institutions and companies linked with 
the energy industry (Satell, 2014), so important for the Russian 
economy, are worth mentioning.
The assessment of the effectiveness of the economic measures 
aimed against the political interests of the Kremlin should take the 
characteristics of today’s financial structure on a global scale into 
consideration, as well as the fact if these restrictions will really be 
felt by the companies and policy makers. It is naïve to claim that 
the introduction of such sanctions and restrictions could really dis-
courage Putin, or other Russian policy makers, from their aggres-
sive actions. Nevertheless, such measures taken by the interna-
tional groups are to result in the behaviour incurring the increase 
of the costs which will finally weaken the Russian economic system, 
and then its political regime (Satell 2014).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia had huge 
problems with the transformation from the economically backward 
economy to the economic modernization or the creation of an eco-
nomic superpower (Matuszewska, 2010: 215). Thus, being cut off 
from the international financial system will constitute a real prob-
lem. As a result, the Russian economic entities had problems with 
repaying their credits and had to resign from the first public offer-
ings, or had problems with selling their bonds. It translated into the 
escape of foreign capital and limiting their investments, which must 
have negatively affected the gross national income. Additionally, 
in the monetary area, the strong external pressure on the Russian 
ruble appeared, which caused increased inflation. These problems 
of the Russian economy also negatively impacted its perception by 
the credit rating agencies, which resulted in the further outflow of 
the capital and the relocations of the funds towards the risk analy-
sis (Satell, 2014).
The meeting of the representatives of the USA, Ukraine and 
Russia held in Geneva on 17th April was the main platform of the 
international dialogue on the future of the Ukrainian state. The 
UE was represented by Catherine Ashton, the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In the EU’s 
opinion, her actions should contribute significantly to the stabi-
lization of the acute situation and to the response of the interna-
tional community to the Ukrainian problem (EU; US; Ukraine and 
Russia to meet on 17 April in Geneva 1). The main subject was 
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to determine the obligations the involved parties should undertake 
in order to stabilize the situation in the area of the Eastern neigh-
bour of the united Europe where the military conflict commenced. 
First of all, it was stated that in order to stop the violence and the 
use of broadly understood provocations, all the types of paramili-
tary groups should be disarmed and all the public buildings should 
be vacated by them, which would made it possible for the state ad-
ministration to somehow function. Additionally, the necessity of the 
presence and need for the unrestricted actions of the OSCE obser-
vatory mission was emphasized. The mission should be responsible 
for controlling and monitoring the actions of the involved parties 
and putting all the Geneva decisions into practice (Fact Sheet EU-
Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 4).
Originally, the OSCE mission was supposed to be accepted both 
by the Ukrainian government and by the local communities, also 
in the areas which were in the crisis. What is more, the USA, Rus-
sia, and the UE announced their support for the actions of the 
international envoys and provide their support for them or send 
their own experts (Joint Statement, 2014: 1). However, the practice 
demonstrated that the Russian side preferred sending the organized 
military groups to conduct the propaganda actions and the political 
activists rather than to support any observatory mission. One of the 
solutions leading to stopping the conflict in the Ukrainian state can 
be another meeting in Geneva and potentially replacing the OSCE 
mission with the tripartite peace activities of the USA, Ukraine, 
and Russia. In a simplified version, the army, the police, etc. would 
work under three flags, which would increase the legitimization 
of such forces and improve their functioning in the conflict area 
Nevertheless, such a solution, presented by the EU Ambassador 
in Russia, Michael Emerson, could be approved by all the involved 
parties.9 Additionally, carrying out such assumptions would be im-
perfect due to the size of the area which must be controlled and the 
willingness of the EU (as the real mediating party) to get involved.
9 Looking from a historical point of view, it would be the solution similar to the 
one functioning in Berlin in 1945, in which the vehicles patrolling the city had 
American, British, French and Russian signs. Demonstrating the example of the 
solutions from the occupation after World War II is in this case inadequate, if we 
compare the behaviour of Hitler and Putin, stimulated by the post-Weimar Republic 
syndrome, more information on :Johnson, P. “Is Vladimir Putin Another Adolf Hit-
ler?” Forbes (16 April 2014): Web. 1 December 2014 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
currentevents/2014/04/16/is-vladimir-putin-another-adolf-hitler/>
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The statement that the Ukrainian problem required the real sta-
bilizing power without whose activities further dwelling on the iden-
tity and position of this country would not be appropriate seems 
trivial. In Steven Blockmans’ and Daniel Gros’ opinions, who rep-
resent the Center for European Policy Studies, the EU would be 
able to send its policing mission – EUPM – to the Ukrainian ter-
ritory. The basis for such a step would be the official invitation 
from the government in Kiev and the final decision of the Council 
of the European Union (Blockmans and Gros, 2014: 2).The author 
relates the opinions of these two experts to highlight the possible 
EU activities in the problematic territory, reminding the readers 
that the united Europe had experiences in conducting such opera-
tions in different regions of the world, among them in the socially 
strongly antagonized societies of the Balkan countries such as the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or 
Kosovo.10 So, this is the instrument which is used and can easily 
obtain international approval, at the same time being the real proof 
of the EU involvement perceptible by the Ukrainians (Zięba 2011).11
According to Reuters, in April 2014 the British, Swedish, and 
Polish sides together created the document with the suggestion of 
establishing the abovementioned policing mission in Ukraine, at 
the same time realizing that the idea of such involvement will be 
negatively assessed by Moscow. The organization of any coordinated 
activities on the territory of Ukraine should be based on the support 
of all the member states and the preparation for the strong criticism 
from Russia, which will accuse the Western countries of meddling 
in the Ukrainian internal affairs. In practice, this involvement of the 
experts was supposed to affect both the decisions of Kiev’s govern-
ment, and also functioning of the troops in the whole of the coun-
try. The content of the document prepared by London, Stockholm, 
and Warsaw was to be consulted with all the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the EU member states (Emmott and Croft, 2014).
It could be an added value, not only in the sense of the poli-
tics at the highest level, but also functioning of such a mission, or 
10 EUPOL Proxima concluded on the territory of Macedonia; EUPM function-
ing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EULEX KOSOVO functioning on the territory 
of Kosovo.
11 Nevertheless, it is worth paying attention to the real determinants of the 
involvement of the EU countries on the Balkan territory. When describing the 
activities of the German economic entities in the former Yugoslavia, Eduard Hus-
son used the term; economic soft-imperialism, which reveals one of the reasons of 
stabilizing this region by the EU countries.
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rather reporting from it, would make all the capitals of the member 
states realize the essence of the Ukrainian conflict. If we look at 
only at the internal conditions in the EU, then the establishment 
of such a form of the involvement in the territory of Ukraine would 
be based on the resolutions of the Helsinki Headline Goal from 
2010. One of its main assumptions was creating the possibilities 
for sending an adequate number of experts to the areas of the pri-
ority activities of the The Common Security and Defence Policy and 
supporting the established missions. Another important intention 
was creating the logistic and technical base enabling the carrying 
out of missions properly taking into consideration the necessity of 
creating an efficient system of public procurement, which in each 
case is a very challenging assumption when looking at the political 
reality in which a particular mission must function.12
As a counterbalance, it is worth adding that there exists a pos-
sibility of introducing the elements of policing cooperation within 
the OSCE mission, which partly would imitate the Georgian case.13 
Undoubtedly, the activities in the sphere of the coordinated manag-
ing of the borders in cooperation with the Ukrainian border guard 
(Blockmans and Gros, 2014: 2) could constitute the further area of 
potential involvement of the EU experts. It is especially important in 
the case in which we observed that the Eastern border of Ukraine 
was no obstacle for the flow of the whole military units, equipment 
and supporting elements. Of course, assessing critically the as-
sumption of commencing such EU activities, one can state that 
for integrating anything in this case one should have the border. 
Apart from that, it would be adequate to station the real repelling, 
or maybe pushing out, military forces here which would eliminate 
the potential threats and in turn would mean a little borderland 
war with the participation of the EU member states.
The abovementioned ideas of the grassroots operational and 
stabilizing involvement of the international community, including 
the EU side, should not be taken into consideration even in the 
12 In order to get acquainted with all the goals at which the EU aims, it is 
worth reading this document, which takes into account both the civilian and mili-
tary dimensions of the Common Security and Defense Policy in practice, see: Civil-
ian Headline Goal 2010, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf, 28.05.2014 
13 It is worth remembering that the involvement of the international forces 
there officially ended on 1st January 2009 and mainly Russia is to blame for it, see: 
P. Kościński, Misja OBWE musi opuścić Gruzję, 23-12-2008, available at: http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/238382.html, 28.05.2014
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theoretical sphere without the full comprehension of the self-propel-
ling cataclysm in Ukraine. Of course, the EU highlighted the neces-
sity of enforcing the law and meting out justice to all the perpetra-
tors of the riots or other acts of violence which took place on the 
Ukrainian territory. Incidentally, it can be added that the Council 
of the European Union encouraged Kiev’s government to appoint its 
own representative in the advisory team of the European Council 
(Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Ukraine- 
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 2014: 1). Of course, one can debate 
how effective the participation in this organization would be in solv-
ing the individual aspects of this conflict.
In political practice, the reactions and long-term behaviour of 
the communities in the east of Ukraine are the most important 
issue, which results from the total instrumentalization and falsifi-
cation of the information about such sentiments (Emerson, 2014: 
1). One question remains unanswered: will the radical attitudes 
automatically spread or will they need the further support from 
Russia? It is worth remembering that in the Lugansk District and in 
the Donetsk District there is a high percentage of Russian-speaking 
citizens, from 50% to 60%. In the superficial comparison, Kharkov 
and Dnipropetrovsk seemed to be areas with the smaller escalation 
of antagonisms. Therefore, the results of the referenda, of course 
affected by the utilization of propaganda and mass disinformation, 
were supposed to demonstrate the discontentment with the activi-
ties of the central authorities (Emerson, 2014: 1).
In the aspect of using force in the antagonized areas, one should 
not forget about the minority living in Ukraine. Due to its axiology 
and consolidating its activities as the promoter of humanitarian 
principles, the united Europe criticized the drastic breaching of the 
human rights, and also the victims from all the socio-political sides 
and options. Additionally, it appealed to the Ukrainian authorities 
to protect and respect the basic rights of their citizens (Council of 
the European Union, Council Conclusions on Ukraine Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, 2014: 1). This assumption gives rise to one para-
dox, because some part of the citizens of this state openly resigns 
from the Ukrainian affiliation, choosing the Russian option or try-
ing to create independent separatist centres. The subjects of the 
ethnic or national minorities and of abiding by the international law 
are especially important in the Crimean peninsula, where the Ta-
tars were subjected to the process of artificial assimilation from the 
very beginning of the Russian occupation. This process consisted 
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of using unambiguous persuasion, or even threats and physical 
repressions (Amnesty International Public Statement , 2014; 1).
Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian transit position for supplying en-
ergy raw materials to the whole of Europe makes this country ge-
ostrategically significant. The EU side realized that the energetic 
security, and the reasonable level of prices connected with it – both 
for citizens and industry – will determine the stabilization of the 
Eastern neighbour. That is why the EU announced its cooperation 
with Kiev’s government in this area, which was supposed to be 
based on the financial support for the Ukrainian budget and at-
tempts to diversify the supplies in the long-term perspective (Eu-
ropean Commission’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 5), because oth-
erwise these will only be temporary, short-term activities, similar 
to anti-crisis ones in their character, and not building any energetic 
alternative to the Ukrainian state. The EU announced assistance 
in the form of delivering energy to Ukraine through concentrating 
on the diversification of the sources of supply, modernizing the 
energy base and improving energetic transmission infrastructure 
(European Council: Statement of the Heads of State or Government 
on Ukraine, 2014: 4). Such optimistic assumptions and plans are 
in fact an answer to the vital interests of the whole of the European 
Union and its member states concerning the energy issues impor-
tant both for the economic development and for the standard of 
living of the citizens in the united Europe. However, apart from the 
unclear aspects of planning or mentioning the necessity of under-
taking such political and economic steps in times of crisis, no sensi-
ble EU actions in this area has been undertaken so far, which also 
results from not fulfilling the conditions included in the treaties. 
The case mainly concerns the raw materials dependency, which 
may translate itself to a partial collision in the particular sphere of 
contacts without any danger of a big-scale conflict (Matuszewska, 
2010: 206). It can be simply depicted as exchanging the Cold War 
between the two blocks with a warm war between the contracting 
parties. Such diplomatic aspects are especially important when one 
looks at the tendencies concerning lowering the export of gas to the 
European countries and shrinking of the crude oil market, which 
in the future will mean $100 billion yearly losses for the Russian 
economy. This constitutes over 5% of this countries GNP, which is 
very important in relation to the long-term and ambitious plans of 
Vladimir Putin, who aims at strengthening his country. As it ap-
pears, these plans may have very week foundations (Satell, 2014).
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In turn, when talking about the modernization of the energy 
system in Ukraine, it is worth remembering that the reform of this 
sector will be based on the principles of the Energy Community, 
to which this East-European country has belonged since 11th Feb-
ruary 2011.14 One of the real activities increasing the investments 
in this sector are the activities of the European Investment Bank, 
which was involved in the project of the pipeline in Ukraine and 
should be implemented during the next three years. The initial cost 
of this enterprise amounts to €1.5 billion (European Commission’s 
Support to Ukraine, 2014: 3). Returning to the current issue of the 
reverse supplies, the legal basis for such an activity is the agree-
ment about the cooperation between the operators of the Slovakian 
and Ukrainian transmission systems from December 2013, which 
finally was not signed. In this case, the European Commission tried 
to lobby for approving this document and implementing its basic 
terms. Additionally, creating the possibilities of reverse supplies 
to Ukraine through Bulgaria and Romania, or also Croatia and 
Hungary, will be an important issue.
According to the European Commission, initiating a tripar-
tite dialogue of the European Union, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine in order to modernize the energy system of Ukraine will be 
an appropriate step from the middle-term perspective (European 
Commission’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 7). The author considers 
such an approach extremely optimistic or naïve, taking into consid-
eration the condition of the transmission structures there and the 
huge scale of investments, and also technical and scientific sup-
port which must be utilized to effect real repairs and improvements 
in this sector. What is more, the Russian side experiences similar 
problems and it does not intend to sponsor such positive changes 
in its Western neighbour, which in the Russian opinion must stay 
in the Kremlin’s zone of influence. The political reality shows that 
for making this assumption come true, in its external affairs Russia 
uses also the trade in and transmission of energy raw materials. 
It is worth remembering that the Ukrainian economy suffers from 
high energy consumption, and still feels the results of the errors 
made during the reprehensible privatization process, which is why 
the energy sphere there is so easily politicized. Apart from that 
the pressure exerted by financial or crime spheres, whose goal is 




to control the energy and fuel sectors, must be taken into account. 
When analyzing these issues from the sphere of external markets, 
then this tense situation between Russia and Ukraine should not 
impact on the transfer or the prices of the energy raw materials in 
the short term perspective. Nevertheless, the intensity of the con-
flict blocks the prospective thinking about the investments in the 
development of the energy sector in Eastern Europe or in the Black 
Sea region. Such was the behaviour of, for example, Royal Dutch 
Shell, which suspended any activities concerning its oil tenement 
on the oil field Skifka on the Black Sea, although it does not mean 
complete losing interest in this area with hydrocarbons (“Key ways 
to trade oil and gas price movements on Ukraine tension”). The de-
pendencies presented above demonstrate not only the complexity of 
the conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian sides, but also the 
challenges to the EU’s own security that it must face.
Continuing the economic theme and the theme of the involve-
ment on the part of the EU, which in its nature is directed at such 
cooperation or assistance, it is worth stressing that fulfilling all the 
terms of the Association Agreement, among them the establishment 
of the complex and deepened free trade zone, will be the priority in 
the relations between the EU and Ukraine. €11 billion were given 
to Ukraine for the purpose of stimulating further reforms in the eco-
nomic and political spheres in accordance with the decision of the 
European Commission of 5th March 2014. The financial resources 
are to be gathered from the funds of the EU and international fi-
nancial institutions in the next few years. Basically, this money 
should be earmarked for the preparation of the Ukrainian struc-
tures to the participation in the abovementioned zone. That is why, 
on 14th April, the EU side decided to temporarily lift the customs 
duties for the Ukrainian export, which took place till 23rd April (Fact 
Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels, 2014: 5). Additionally, the EU 
executive body had another idea, which was the possibility of using 
the terms of the Association Agreement concerning the transpor-
tation of goods – for example, the reduction of tariffs on the basis 
of the future project of the Council of the European Union about 
autonomous trade means for Ukraine. Such a short term solution 
would be a one-sided step of the EU bodies – including the Council 
of the European Union and the European Parliament – responsi-
ble for approval of such political decisions, which could actually 
influence the Ukrainian economy (European Commission’s Support 
to Ukraine, 2014: 4).
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One can, of course, ponder on how the realization of these deci-
sions can really affect the Ukrainian economy, which feels not only 
danger and destabilization resulting from the political situation, 
but also suffers from the effects of the international crisis of 2008. 
According to introductory forecasts, building the free trade zone 
should result in the reduction of tariffs which will make it possible 
to save almost €750 million yearly in the companies from the in-
volved sides (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, 2013: 4). Addition-
ally, it is worth noticing that the Ukrainian economic entities gained 
additional €500 million yearly, thanks to the lowered imports ob-
ligations on the EU Single Market. Apart from that, the Ukrainian 
agricultural sector derived benefits from the lowered customs duties 
on the agricultural products, among them those processed, which 
brought the profit of €400 million (European Commission’s Sup-
port to Ukraine, 2014: 4). Nevertheless, when analyzing the terms 
concerning the free trade zone, one can notice the asymmetry in 
the obligations and goals of both the sides, which results from the 
extremely different levels of the development of the post-Soviet 
country and the European Union. It is the Eastern neighbour that 
should benefit from the opening of the EU market through the im-
mediate lifting of the customs duties by the united Europe. In turn, 
the EU side must be aware that the same step in the economic 
policy will not be promptly taken by Ukraine.
Apart from the potential building of the common trade area, 
the current needs of the Ukrainian state and society must be tak-
en into account in the present situation. The policy makers from 
this country mentioned the sum of $35 billion which their country 
would need in the next few years (Remarks by EU High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton at the End of her Visit to Ukraine, 2014: 1). 
Partly as a response to such information, at the beginning of March 
2014 the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank planned to earmark €11 billion for Ukraine 
on a short term basis. According to the EU bodies, this resources 
should be interpreted as the proof of the active position of the Eu-
ropean Union in the efforts to assist its Eastern partner in order 
to remove its political and economic problems (European Commis-
sion’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 4). When talking about any aid 
directed to Ukraine, it is theoretically worth separating the short 
term dimension, concentrating mainly on direct financial support 
and loans, from the long term activities, including the structural 
investments changing the economic face of this country. Without 
determining the right temporal sequence, no government is able 
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to properly distribute the resources which are in its possession, 
even if it administrates the entire country, and all the sectors work 
efficiently, which is not the case in Ukraine. This is why the short 
term issues that must be finalized immediately include the amounts 
due and the expenditures which must be paid immediately, and an 
attempt at complete reduction of the existing deficit. In turn, in 
the long term perspective, the appropriately planned investments 
– for example, those available thanks to the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment 
Bank – seem to be the most crucial ones (Remarks by EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton at the End of her Vvisit to Ukraine, 
2014: 2–3). As a result, in the next few years, Ukraine could obtain 
€1.6 billion from the EU budged as microfinance assistance loans, 
and €1.4 billion as the packet of assistance subsidies. In addition, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
European Investment Bank were to earmark €8 billion. It is worth 
remembering that the Ukrainian side could also use the some of 
the sum of €3.5 billion available from the Neighborhood Investment 
Facility (European Commission’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 7).
The issue of the Ukrainian economy was also discussed dur-
ing the Geneva summit, at which all the participating sides agreed 
to secure economic stability of the discussed country and earmark 
adequate resources for the purpose of effecting the joint decisions 
(Joint Statement, 2014: 2). The practice shows that the EU would 
be able to address the real assistance aimed at the structural re-
forms together with the support of the experts. In turn, the Rus-
sian Federation is willing to grant substantial loans, which in fact 
are nothing more than diplomatic usury, completely linking Kiev’s 
decisions geopolitically.
What is interesting, the establishment of the mechanism of co-
ordinating short term donors, working under the auspices of the 
European Commission, was supposed to be another form of maxi-
mizing the effects of the addressed economic assistance. It was 
connected with the assumption that such a tool of dialogue would 
constitute the platform serving the purpose of finding the balanced 
solution to the current Ukrainian problems concerning its further 
transformation (European Commission’s Support to Ukraine, 2014: 
4). However, the author thinks that such a plan would take part of 
its identity and position away from the Ukrainian side and its gov-
ernment, who should be responsible for the negotiations with the 
individual global financial institutions, the reasonable absorption of 
various kinds of resources, and also the determination of the needs 
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of its economy, state budget, etc. However, one should remember 
that the IMF and other global financial institutions have their in-
dividual procedures of granting assistance, but they mainly do it 
on the basis of independent assessment of a situation and on de-
termining how significant resources can be addressed to Ukraine. 
Although the International Monetary Fund expressed its willingness 
to commence the dialogue with the new government in Kiev about 
the various planes of financial aid (Remarks by EU High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton at the End of her Visit to Ukraine, 2014: 2–4), 
but these are the independent decisions of these organizations and 
the Ukrainian policy makers.
To a large extent, it depends on the actions of the authorities in 
Kiev and the direction they will choose, what the effects of the ab-
sorption of external resources, of conducting the foreign policy and 
of stabilizing the situation in the whole of the country will be. Nev-
ertheless, the realization of any state reforms in Ukraine and doing 
it in all the political regions and districts was a real problem (Joint 
Statement, 2014: 2). From the short term perspective, it was quite 
important, because without preparing the administrative structures 
in the entire country, the abovementioned assumptions cannot be 
effected. To the High Representative’s mind, the presidential elec-
tions held on the 25th May were supposed to be the key moment for 
the future of Ukraine. It is their course, their campaign style and 
obtaining social legitimization by the future Head of the State that 
will decide if implementing the constitutional reforms and solving 
a number of political and economic problems will be carried out 
(Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Relations Brussels , 2014: 4).
Of course, some doubt could be cast on the sense of holding 
the presidential elections in the east of Ukraine due to the potential 
boycott on a grand scale (Emerson, 2014: 1). In the EU’s opinion, 
the presidential elections should be witnessed by the OSCE observ-
ers, especially with the participation of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights. The Ukrainians from all the regions 
of the country and also the national minorities had to participate 
in these on equal terms, taking into consideration the internation-
al norms concerning the human rights and the civil and political 
rights, to abide by which Kiev pledged (Fact Sheet EU-Ukraine Rela-
tions Brussels, 2014: 5). Finally, Petro Poroshenko was the victor in 
the Ukrainian presidential elections, who already in the first round 
of voting obtained 54.7% of all cast votes (which amounted to 9.86 
million votes) (Interfax-Ukraine “Results of presidential elections 
published in official press on June 3”). Just after this event, which 
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generally was conducted smoothly and according to the democrat-
ic standards, the Ukrainian side appealed to Russia to recognize 
the validity of the election results and to cease to destabilize the 
Eastern regions of Ukraine. In foreign policy, Poroshenko initially 
planned the meetings with the representatives of Berlin and Wash-
ington (Ukraine News One), in order to look for clear support from 
them – not only for his presidency, but also for the very existence of 
his state. What is important, as far as the relations of Ukraine with 
the EU are concerned, the president-elect announced that after 
swearing him into office he will aim at signing the economic part of 
the Association Agreement, building the free trade zone (Interfax-
Ukraine “Poroshenko is going to sign economic deal with EU im-
mediately after inauguration”). Undoubtedly, such announcements 
can be treated as an obvious example of sticking to the pro-Euro-
pean geopolitical course by the Ukrainian state after the changes 
of 2013/2014.15
However, one should emphasize, that during the summit be-
tween the EU and Russia in June 2013, the Kremlin mentioned the 
issue of the fears and dangers for the Russian interests connected 
with the establishment of the free trade zone between Ukraine and 
the EU on the territory of this East European country (Emerson, 
2014: 2). Yet the author warns that it is strictly politicized and ir-
rational Russian interpretation of this process liberalizing the trade. 
The Russian side fears not so much the domination of the entities 
from the EU countries, as primarily setting the standards making 
it impossible to use all the illegal economic and political games, in 
which the entities from the Russian Federation participated. Ad-
ditionally, it is identical with Moscow’s opinion that the influence 
of the Western world will not manifest intellectually or morally, but 
geopolitically, at the same time invading the Russian area (Matusze-
wska, 2010: 199).
Therefore, Ukrainian issues should be perceived in the sphere 
of combat for influence between the two opposing integration cent-
ers. The EU was interpreted by the observers as a great oasis of 
stability surrounded by the world destabilization and able to incor-
porate next European countries, giving them this abovementioned 
state of peace and modernization. The attractiveness of European 
structures that were presented as building a “voluntary empire” 
15 The full agreement was finally signed on 27 June 2014 , see: Pifer, S. “Po-
roshenko Signs EU-Ukraine Association Agreement” Brookings (June 27, 2014 
2:30pm): Web. 12 June 2014 <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/ 
2014/06/27-poroshenko-signs-eu-ukraine-association-agreement-pifer>
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was indisputable in the past. However, the expansion of this liberal 
power and its significance lost its strength, and each expansion 
gave rise to new problems, which had to be dealt with for the sake 
of the entire integration process. The accession of the Central and 
East European countries should have resulted in their stabilization 
and a wide cooperation with the post-Soviet territories; however, 
such steps undertaken by Brussels has caused animosity with Rus-
sia (Kagan, 2009: 27).
The EU, if it finds the political will, should use this flaw or be 
prepared for such Russia’s behaviour, which in the present geo-
political arrangement may assume the role of a “segment empire,” 
trying to utilize all free space in the international system for the 
realization of its raison d’etat. It mainly results from the lack of the 
appropriate tools reinforcing the position on the political scene, 
which forces the Russian side to wait for emerging opportunities for 
fighting for its interests, rather than to create its own opportunities 
(Matuszewska, 2010: 242). One can wonder if such a situation did 
not happen in the case of the Ukrainian pro-democratic uprising 
and turning President Yanukowich into a Kremlin tool.
The question remains if the participation of the USA, or NATO, 
is really necessary for stabilizing the Ukrainian crisis, both in the 
technological and diplomatic spheres. Posing such questions is con-
nected with the sense of the tripartite dialogue and the position 
of the EU itself on the international arena, especially in its rela-
tions with the closest international surroundings. In addition, the 
events on the European continent should not be perceived as the 
separated subsystem of the world order, or rather as one of the ele-
ments of games at the level of the world political interdependencies, 
the example of which can be the attempt of the Western countries 
to solve the problem with Iran, with which Russia has multifaceted 
relations (Kagan, 2009: 228).
Summing up, one can reach the extreme conclusion that the 
Ukrainian issue should constitute an ultimate counterargument 
against any theses on the cooperation between the EU and Rus-
sia in their mutual neighbourhood, unless only creating diplomatic 
documents, without any reference to the political reality, is taken 
into account. The whole problem of Europe is finding a place in 
the geopolitical game in which it could win, but it is blocked by its 
own mistaken awareness. In turn, Russia wants and has to achieve 
a victory, but it cannot experience the lack of means to do it. One 
cannot hide the fact that only an actual military presence in the 
territory of Ukraine can stop the aggressive actions of the Russian 
Michał Rulski84
Federation. Creating unreal conceptions is in fact a pro-Russian 
activity, because it is that side which is a dynamic player trying 
to achieve the goals of its foreign policy, even if they are short term 
or flawed in their conception. It is worth remembering that for the 
addressees of the external activities of the EU (in this case the 
Ukrainians) the real effects of the actions and the relevance of the 
decisions taken by the EU bodies responsible for the international 
policies were the most important – not the voting procedures and 
the political steps. Apart from that, all responsibility for their east-
ern border rests on the Ukrainians, who at the turn of May and 
June 2014 started to openly fight with the alien forces or the ar-
tificially created separatist or terrorist groups. The EU must be 
ready for the real opening of Ukrainian ambitions, of course while 
remaining within the frameworks determined during the bilateral 
meetings or written in the European documents. From the perspec-
tive of one’s own security, a united Europe must be aware that dur-
ing the escalation of such conflicts, its real interests, as well as its 
borders that have still not been trespassed by foreign forces, must 
withstand the intensification of cross-border dangers. For example, 
even the weak reaction to the Arab Spring in 2010 showed that 
the Union is not prepared for the immediate and decisive response 
to events that could threaten its existence. Without creating such 
an ability, one will not be able to talk about the concrete results of 
the EU stance on the crises occurring within the security system.
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